Abstract. This paper uses the development of multi-agent market models to present a unified approach to the joint questions of how financial market movements may be simulated, predicted, and hedged against. We first present the results of agent-based market simulations in which traders equipped with simple buy/sell strategies and limited information compete in speculatory trading. We examine the effect of different market clearing mechanisms and show that implementation of a simple Walrasian auction leads to unstable market dynamics. We then show that a more realistic out-of-equilibrium clearing process leads to dynamics that closely resemble real financial movements, with fat-tailed price increments, clustered volatility and high volume autocorrelation. We then show that replacing the 'synthetic' price history used by these simulations with data taken from real financial time-series leads to the remarkable result that the agents can collectively learn to identify moments in the market where profit is attainable. Hence on real financial data, the system as a whole can perform better than random. We then employ the formalism of Bouchaud in conjunction with agent based models to show that in general risk cannot be eliminated from trading with these models. We also show that, in the presence of transaction costs, the risk of option writing is greatly increased. This risk, and the costs, can however be reduced through the use of a delta-hedging strategy with modified, time-dependent volatility structure.
Introduction
Agent-based models of complex adaptive systems are attracting significant interest across a broad range of disciplines [1] . An important application receiving much attention within the physics community, is the study of fluctuations in financial time-series [2] . Currently many different agent-based models exist in the 'econophysics' literature, each with its own set of implicit assumptions and interesting properties [3] [4] [5] [6] . In general these models exhibit some of the statistical properties that are reminiscent of those observed in real-world financial markets: fat tailed distributions of returns, clustered volatility and so on. These models, despite their differences draw on several of the same key ideas; feedback, frustration, adaptability and evolution.
The Minority Game (MG) introduced by Challet and Zhang [7] offers possibly the simplest paradigm for a system containing these key features. Unlike the sophisticated model of Lux [3] there is no external noise process simulating information arrival. Nor is there any element of agents sharing local information as in the model of Cont and Bouchaud [4] . The MG simply comprises of an odd number of agents N choosing repeatedly between the options of buying (1) and selling (0) a quantity of a risky a e-mail: p.jefferies@physics.ox.ac.uk asset. The resource level of this asset is finite and therefore the agents will compete to buy low and sell high. This gives the game its 'minority' nature; an excess of buyers will force the price of the asset up, consequently the minority of agents who have placed sell orders receive a good price at the penalty of the majority who end up buying at an over-inflated price. The MG agents act with inductive reasoning, using strategies that map the series of recent (binary) asset price fluctuations to an investment decision for the next time-step. In an attempt to learn from their past mistakes the agents constantly update the 'score' of their strategies and use only the most successful one to make their prediction.
The basic assumptions of this system are minimal but the resultant dynamics show a richness and diversity that has been the focus of much recent study . However, the MG as a realistic market model has many shortcomings: -All agents trade at each time-step -All agents trade equal quantities -The system resource level is fixed -Agent diversity is typically limited.
Many of these as well as other interesting extensions (such as agents having the ability to learn of their own market impact [5] ) have been studied separately and are discussed in [2] . This paper aims to jointly develop many of these 494 The European Physical Journal B extensions to the basic MG in an attempt to build a minimal and yet realistic market model.
The development and study of market models from a physicist's standpoint is motivated by the desire to learn what key interactions are responsible for phenomena observed in the real-world system, the financial marketplace. However, the scope for using such market models is not simply limited to qualitative phenomenological studies. The models may be extended or manipulated to explore quantitatively the emergence of empirical scaling laws. Alternatively, the approach to 'critical' self-organized, or stable states may be examined [13] . These are just a few of the uses which could be categorized as 'theoretical' study. What then can these models be used for on a more 'practical' or perhaps commercial level?
Recently we have been working on the possibility of using these market models in a similar way to the way in which a meteorologist may use a model of atmospheric dynamics; i.e. condition the models with observed data and let them run into the future to extract probabilistic forecasts. These forecasts may then be used for not only speculative gain but also for more insightful risk management and portfolio optimization. Section 2 of this text will expand on the idea of using the MG as a market model, detailing the extensions needed, Section 3 will then explore two different market-making mechanisms, assessing the resultant dynamics, Section 4 will detail how these models may be used for predictive purposes and Section 5 will focus on risk and portfolio optimization.
The MG as a market model

The basic MG
As mentioned in the previous section, the MG formulation captures some of the behavioral phenomena that are thought to be of importance in financial markets; those of competition, frustration, adaptability and evolution. It is also a 'minimal' system of only few parameters: The memory of an agent is the number of bits of the most recent past global history that are used by a strategy in order to form a prediction. The agents are assigned their s i strategies at the start of the game and are not allowed to replace them at any point. Each agent uses the historically most successful of her strategies to form a prediction, the predictions of all agents are then pooled and the global history is updated with the prediction of the minority group.
A single strategy maps each of the 2 m possible 'histories' to a prediction. represents the dilute phase. The properties of the crowded and dilute phases of the game are quite different and could be thought of as representing different regimes of a market. In the crowded phase there will at any one time be a large number of agents who are using the same (best) strategy and so will flood into the market as large groups, producing large swings in supply and demand and a consequently high volatility. If the memory of the agents is larger such as to render Ns ∼ 2 m+1 then the groups of agents using the same (best) strategy (crowds) will be smaller. There will also be groups of agents who are forced to use the anti-correlated (worst) strategy, these can be thought of as anti-crowds as they cancel the market action of the crowds. This cancellation effect causes a reduction in the market volatility. In the dilute phase it is very unlikely that any agents will hold the same strategies and so the market behaves more randomly and can be modelled well as a group of independent coin-tossers. A theory based on these crowding effects reproduces quantitative results for the market volatility in the basic and so called 'thermal' MG across the full range of parameters N , m, s. For more details of this the reader is referred to [12, 15] . This 'Crowd, Anticrowd Theory' may also be put to use in the formulation of an entirely analytical set of dynamical mapping equations that reproduce the MG [16] . These equations can be analyzed in several interesting limiting cases to unveil the dynamics underlying microscopic behavior in different regimes of the game. They may also be used in the analysis of approaches to unstable behavior in these types of games (and possibly the real market itself). Our preliminary studies have identified that there can be at least two different 'types' of build up to a large movement (or 'crash'). Further work is currently underway to investigate the various 'types' of crash that can occur
The grand-canonical MG
In the basic MG agents must either buy or sell at every time-step. In a real market however, traders are likely to wait on the sidelines until they are reasonably confident that they are able to make a profit with their next trade. They will observe the market passively, mentally updating their various strategies, until their confidence overcomes some threshold value -then they will jump in and make a trade. We now demonstrate an extension to the basic MG which attempts to incorporate this general behavioral pattern.
The primitive binary agents of the basic MG keep a tally of the virtual score r S,i of each of their s i strategies, +1 for a correct prediction and −1 for an incorrect prediction and virtual in the sense that the strategy is scored
